Guyana’s Position

Today, Guyana is one of the most highly indebted nations (Ramsaran, 1992:143), and is documented as one of the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere with a per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of US $800 in 2000 (Egoumé-Bossogo, 2003:1). Yet, the theme of increasing poverty within this poor nation is not a part of the narrative of the proponents of globalization when they preach about its so-called benefits. A central concern for Laura D’Andrea Tyson, former national economic adviser in the Clinton’s administration is that “as globalization intensifies, the gap between per capita incomes in rich and poor countries has widened.” (Cutter et al., 2000) Moreover, there is not any strategy that has yet emerged to help this country reap any benefits from globalization {that is because globalization is about profits for the globalizers}. This country, I argue, continues to be peripheralized and [re]colonized as it continues to succumb to the dictates of the IMF and the World Bank.

In the guise of attempting to [re]claim its debts, the World Bank and the IMF developed a Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) by playing an increasingly important role in regulating the economy of this indebted country without pausing to consider the staggering adjustment cost in terms of soaring unemployment and social distress facing this nation. This country “cannot now avoid adjustment conditionalities as [it has] become the sine qua non” of capitalist exploitation (Cheru, 1997:148). More importantly, economic restructuring is based on the assumption that the free market, acting without restraint, is the only efficient allocator of resources and the best instrument of social discipline. As such, freeing market forces would not only reshape Guyana’s economy by modernizing it, but it will destroy the basis for the state controlled economy as practiced by the People’s National Congress (PNC) government. From the 1970s until the 1980s under the Burnham’s administration, the government had utilized a state controlled economy. Nonetheless, under the SAP, the preceding governments have cemented the country’s historic allegiance with a centralized state-controlled system to one that is market-oriented with the private sector playing the leading role.⁹ In Guyana from the 1980s, the trade liberalization schemes imposed by the IMF and the World Bank make sure that its forest and mining sectors are opened to exploitation by foreign investors. A number of foreign investors such as the Berjava Group and Solid Timber Sendirian from Malaysia, and the Buchanan Group from Canada, companies with dubious environmental and social tract records, have acquired logging rights in Guyana (Sizer and Rice, 1996:46). What is vexing is that under the terms of a recent IMF agreement Guyana now offers multinationals a ten-year exemption from all taxes.

The following section will look briefly at Guyana’s history, an illuminating and sagacious narrative background for providing a discursive analysis on the impact of globalization on the Fourth World. It is about Guyana’s centering economic development beginning from the 1980s, when Guyana’s economy began to take on its ultimate shape.

Guyana : A Brief Background

When President Desmond Hoyte took office in 1985, the President’s intention was to revitalize the economy and placed it on a path of economic growth and development, which proved more difficult than he had ever anticipated. The severe fall in bauxite, one of Guyana’s leading export and declining sugar production had resulted in lower foreign exchange earnings and this created economic difficulties for the government (Ramsaran, 1992:p.x). It was not unusual that the government began borrowing abroad to finance the purchase of essential imports. External debt ballooned to US$1.6 billion by 1988, almost four times as large as Guyana's Gross Domestic Product (GDP), (ibid. 143) which was $295 million US dollars (Agency for International Development, 1992:112). The government became increasingly unable to meet its debt obligations. Overdue payments reached a staggering US$1 billion in 1988. Rather than risk a curtailment of all foreign credit (even short-term loans), the government myopically lifted all curbs on foreign activity and ownership in 1988 and introduced the Economic Reform Program (ERP) in the same year. The ERP’s interrelated objectives were to restore economic growth, to incorporate the ‘parallel economy’ into the ‘official economy,’ “to eliminate external and internal payments imbalances, and to normalize Guyana's financial relations with its foreign creditors.” (U.S. Library of Congress, 1992)

Under the ERP, the government’s role in the economy was reduced significantly. International corporations were hired to manage the two largest state-owned bauxite mines, for instance. However, efforts to privatize the two state-owned bauxite mining companies, Berbice Mining Company and Linden Mining Company, have so far been unsuccessful. Also, under the ERP, the Guyana dollar became almost worthless because of its devaluation. By the end of the 1980s, in the face of a rapidly sliding socioeconomic landscape, the Guyanese dollar was equivalent to about $27.00 US. More importantly, the prices of basic consumer products were increasing at a faster pace, while wage and salary adjustments, as would be expected, lag significantly behind these price increases. The economy continued to contract with high rate of inflation and a declining GDP. By 1990, the nation ended its disastrous twenty years experiment with a closed government controlled economy and moved toward a free-market economy under the direct guidance of the IMF and the World Bank, which provided for the three-year Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF). After the ESAF ended in December 1993, it was again extended. In September 1996, the ESAF became the centerpiece of the IMF's strategy to help low-income countries including Guyana. What this meant was the abandonment of control of its economic directions by the Guyanese government, which was replaced by the new actors the IMF and the World Bank. Neocolonialism, an updated form of control by another country or interest, in this case the IMF and the World Bank, is the system that now engulfs Guyana.

The IMF and the World Bank, the defacto tools of global governance, are directing the course that Guyana’s economy should pursue. However, this is not a new phenomenon. Guyana’s history has deepened and confirmed that it has always been one of adapting and adjustment to external forces. For example, colonial power, namely Britain, dictated its values, laws, well-being, foreign policy, and its social and economic stability (Ramsaran, 2002:8). Against the background of the historical legacy of colonial dominance in Guyana, a much more fruitful context for understanding Guyana’s economic development in which Guyana has played an increasingly peripheral role in order to sustain the mother country, which is worth overemphasizing, is inevitably provided. Yet, as Chaitram Singh describes, Guyana’s struggle to be independent of colonial rule was not a big struggle between the colonial ruler, Britain and Guyana. He explains that:

Delays in setting a date for independence were tactical and were linked to Cold War considerations. Essentially, the British was seeking to leave behind in power in Guyana a party, or it turned out, a coalition of parties that was acceptable to them and to the United States. In these circumstances, the struggle for independence became transformed into an internal struggle for power, one that resulted in the racial polarization of the Guyanese society (Singh, 1988: 35-36).

More fundamental, in Guyana, power and politics have been centered more on race/ethnicity rather than on ideology since the split of the \ultiracial People’s Progressive Party (PPP) in 1955.

In his book titled Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism , Kwame Nkrumah summed up the dangers of this new form of control. He noted that:

For those who practice [neocolonialism], it means power without responsibility and for those who suffer from it, it means exploitation without redress. In the days of old-fashioned colonialism, the imperial power had at least to explain and justify at home the actions it was taking abroad. In the colony those who served the ruling imperial power could at least look to its protection against any violent move by their opponents. With neocolonialism neither is the case. (1965::xi)

For Nkrumah, his critical reflection affords him to conclude that “neocolonialism is the worst form of imperialism” (ibid.) “in [imperialism’s] final and perhaps its most dangerous stage.” (1965:ix) Given the present economic constraints, in the form of structural adjustment programs imposed on Guyana by the IMF and the World Bank allowing them to dictate the economic path that Guyana’s government should embark upon, a spiral of economic and social problems for the majority of Guyanese are prevalent. In the meanwhile, the ruling elite and the foreign companies are the absolute beneficiaries.

Thus far, I have focused on the general effect of globalization on poor nations. I will now look specifically at trade liberalization in Guyana within the framework of globalization and the theory of the state.

Globalization and Guyana’s Natural Resources

Like many of these poor nations, Guyana has adopted the Foreign Direct Investment Plan (FDIP) initiated by the World Bank, which grants generous fiscal incentives to lure multinational corporations into the country. Guyana's drive for foreign investments is based, almost solely, on the liquidation of its natural resources namely its rainforest for commercial logging and mining. Guyana's mining sector with sizable reserves of bauxite, gold, and diamond has been under severe attack by foreign companies. It is not a secret that over exploitation of these resources can result in environmental degradation. In light of this dilemma, the Guyanese government has implemented certain environmental laws. However, these foreign companies have indicated their reluctance to respect the environmental laws. Buchanan, a Canadian company sought a 1,400,000 hectare concession and was, unfortunately, successful (Toni, 1997). The Canadian Labor Union indicates that “Buchanan has a long, notorious track record of doing all that it can to avoid forestry, environmental, and labor legislation.” (ibid.) It is not a secret that “ Guyana has no comprehensive laws on land-use planning, monitoring, and enforcement,” (ibid) and as a result, the Guyanese government is faced with a huge and complex problem as is illustrated. It becomes easy, then, for companies to effortlessly bypass these laws. A commonly known case is the major cyanide spill by the Canadian Omai Gold Mines Company in 1995 causing massive damage to the Omai and Essequibo rivers, the main source of drinking water for many of the Indigenous Peoples or Amerindians.¹⁰

Although the government did appropriately implement the Environmental Protection Act No. 11 of 1996, requiring that an environmental impact assessment be observed before companies can conduct mining in the areas; these companies continue to bypass the environmental laws without any qualms. It is discernible that the government’s lack of adequate resources to regulate and enforce environmental standards for large-scale mining has superciliously contributed to the bypassing of the laws by foreign companies. Ana Toni clearly highlights the extent of this overriding quandary. She illuminates this by explaining that “ The Guyana Forestry Commission (GFC) is responsible for monitoring registered cutting practices on some 6.3 million hectares of forest as well as unregistered activities. The GFC has about 7 fully qualified foresters on its staff, none of whom are directly involved in the management of the forestry.” (ibid.). As a World Bank Report acknowledges that not only does the Guyana Geology and Mines Commission has no scientists to carry o

ut meaningful studies of the environmental problems, more so there are no appropriate regulations to properly manage and harness the environmental impacts of mining (World Bank, 1993). More distressing and equally appalling is that an agreement with the IMF, in its utter disengagement and failure to police these foreign companies, allows them to be exempted from being taxed by the Guyanese government for ten years as I have already mentioned.

A readable observation, as relevant, is that Guyana faces a serious dilemma. The hyperrealism is that natural resources are scarce, and their full ecological, social, cultural, and economic values need to be recognized. The current model of economic development that is being pursued by the IMF and the World Bank has proved to be utterly useless as well as fundamentally flawed. Even so, it seeks growth at all costs without regard to ecological limits.¹¹ Instead of allowing the IMF and the World Bank to solely dictate its economic path, the main task for the government is to create policies that would shape market forces. As such, the main emphasis “is not getting the state out, but finding the state’s appropriate roles for fostering economic growth and development with both the state and private sector.” (Callaghy, 1993:165) At the core of this analysis is that the state and the market cannot be substitutes for each other, but must be linked to each other. David Harvey provides important evidence that states which maintain a balance between the state and the market and organize on corporatist principles, like Singapore and Taiwan¹² have done relatively well in this era where the free market ideology is more the norm within the capitalist globalization process (Harvey, 1995:11).

In Guyana, many of these mines and prospects are still in their primary phases of development and it is not a secret that the cumulative environmental impact of all this mining is severe and consequential. A substantial increase in aluminum and gold mining by foreign mining corporations is evident, and this, in no uncertain terms, is having serious environmental consequences for Guyana’s rainforests. Yet, Canada's Home Oil, a company owned by Canadians is exploring for oil in Guyana's interior. Certainly it is true that Canada's Alcan, another Canadian owned company is also involved in mining what is left of Guyana's bauxite and aluminum (Gifford, 1994-1995)

A report produced by the World Rainforest Movement indicated that “the environmental impacts of mining in the area are apparent: the water is discolored and heavy with sediments, piles of debris accumulate at the river banks, some of which have disappeared because of missile dredging.” (WRM, 2001) Despite greater attention paid to environmental issues and problems internationally, it is instructive to recognize that environmental degradation, which is of the least concern to the disengaged international community, is accelerating in Guyana. The unruly practice of mining continues to the detriment of Guyana’s forests and the continued alienation of its indigenous peoples whom historically have their widely acclaimed affinity to these lands. Yet, the government continues to issue mining permits. Under Guyanese law, according to Section 6 of the 1989 Mining Act, the government is the owner of all mineral resources. Conclusively, then, the government can legally issue mining permits to these foreign investors.

The government's decision to open the mining sector to foreign investment attracted companies from countries including the United States, Canada, and Australia. What is unsettling is that even though the government established the Guyana Manufacturing and Industrial Development Agency (GMIDA) to streamline foreign investment process, companies have been able to secure favorable contracts. Some of the stipulations within the contracts include “the exemption of paying consumption and capital gains taxes, duty-free imported goods, support for tax treaties with foreign countries, and the right to export unprocessed timbers.” (U.S Library of Congress, 1992) The injection of western capital into this nation points into the direction of a new form of colonization taking place.

What is more is that in spite of Guyana's forest wealth, government income from logging activities in 1995 totaled less than US$1 million (Toni, 1997). The reason for this is twofold. The minimal royalties and fees in the forestry sector further reduce the contribution to the national economy and the fees charged to companies extracting timber are extremely low. It is about less than 1 to 2 percent of total production and export costs (ibid.). In addition, the government collects little direct revenue from the operations of foreign companies. Take the case of Barama Company¹³, the three sources of direct revenue the government collects are:

1. an export tax (2% of the export value) payable only on greenheart logs.
2. an area tax of G$0.185 (U$ 0.0013) per hectare per year (US$ 2,211 per year for the entire concession).
3. a small royalty of U$ 0.30 to U$ 0.96 per cubic meter for the first four years depending on the species, U$ 0.46 to U$ 1.45 per cubic meter in years five to eight, and so on in increments up to year 20 (ibid.).

In 1994, about 13,000 cubic meters of timber were exported for a total of $2.8 million US dollars (Flaming, 1995). While these companies are benefiting from the exploitation of Guyana’s natural resources, many Guyanese continue to have low living standards. A study done by the World Resource Institute (WRI) accurately identifies that the wages these companies pay are about US$2.25 to US$4.25 per day (WRI, 1994).

Guyana’s painful historical legacy of colonial exploitation lays the ground for the specificity of neo-colonization under the SAP. In fact, the adjustment strategy has been predicated entirely on the exploitation of this country’s natural resources, including tropical forests and minerals. This strategy has benefited only the multinationals and has failed to translate into real benefits for the ordinary people. As a result, local communities are disempowered and Guyana’s natural resources are in the hands of foreign companies. As this form of neo-colonization manifests itself, the Guyanese government needs to re-negotiate the contracts with these companies on lucrative terms that will benefit its citizens instead of protecting and sanctioning the interests of multinationals.

Poverty and Political Instability in Guyana

The implementation of the SAP has undoubtedly caused economic hardship for many Guyanese despite some observers’ centering propagation that the SAP is working to the benefits of Guyana’s economy. In fact, it clearly subordinates the needs of Guyana’s domestic economy to that of the global economy. The “economic crisis” facing Guyana is deepening considerably and it is accompanied by the rapid deterioration of public services, the collapsed of the infrastructure,¹⁴ the repositioning of needed skilled and professional staff, and a sharp decline of upward social mobility. The remittances that Guyanese citizens received from relatives and friends living abroad and the country’s self-sufficiency in producing basic food crops, to a great degree, keep the economic decline in this country from becoming a huge disaster. While the formal economy is compressing, the black market economy is thriving. For example, foreign currency exchanges are performed on the streets because of the higher returns by a street vendor than the banks. Social inequality has started to spread like wild fire and the government, in a state of extreme disarray, tries to deal with the racial tension between the two largest social groups, Blacks and East Indians as it inevitably surfaces.¹⁵

Before the implementation of the SAP in 1988, workers in both the private and the public sectors received overtime pay for working more than forty hours a week, fringe benefits, and vocation pay. By 1990, over time pay has become a thing of the past. What is more, almost half of the country’s workers are working waged jobs under poor working conditions, low pay, and the lack of collective bargaining legislation. The United States Department of Labor estimated in 1990, that a mere 25 percent of Guyana’s work force was unionized.¹⁶ Meanwhile, the role of trade unions has been redefined. Like in most of the capitalist economies, labor unions in Guyana are not currently able to guarantee workers their hard won rights. One reason for this, I think, is that the state sees no need to disciple capital because globalization has been accompanied by a fundamental shift of political power away from unions towards multinational corporations.

Many of the unionized jobs no longer exist. A large proportion of Guyanese are wage-workers, the new proletarians of the 21st century, working within the service sector. From 1997 to 2002, the highest pay for employees in grocery stores, hardware stores, drug stores, dry good stores, and taverns was $G.1,824.00 per week. In areas of hotels, guesthouses, discotheques, night-clubs and liquor restaurants the highest pay was $3,124.00 per week. For those working in non-service jobs including timber grant workers and saw mill workers, the pay rate was $332.00 per day (Caribbean Labor Statistics, 2002).¹⁷

These low wages often are not enough to even cover basis need such as food and clothing, and also the costs of daily commuting to work. Many children are taken out of school and are selling candies, peanuts, cigarettes, and other items on the streets, especially in Georgetown, Linden and other urban cities, so that they can supplement the income of their households. A process of pauperization amongst children and adults is becoming visible as it envelopes the streets, especially within the volatile, urban settings, while profits from the forest and mining sectors enrich the foreign companies. Comparable is the situation in many poor African nations where for instance, the Royal Dutch Shell, which controls half the oil production, Chevron and Mobil are enriched in the oil producing Niger Delta region.

Statistics, in rich detail, reveal the projecting, harmful impact of the SAP, in terms of the hypervisibility of escalating poverty level, in Fourth World nations. In the case of Guyana, some formative attempts to quantify the poverty level were done by the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), which, in a distressing way, highlighted the extensiveness and scope of the problem. In 1988, 61 percent of the population was living below the poverty and by 1989 it has increased to 67 percent (Nallari, 2003:9). Also, the Food and Agriculture Organization Investment Center Studies and Report series in 1997 confirmed that in 1992-1993, a national Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES) was carried out by the Statistical Bureau, and in order to provide more data on the social sectors, a Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS) was agreed to, under the guidance and direction of the World Bank in collaboration with HIES. It was not so shocking that these surveys estimated that more than half of the total Guyanese population continued to live in poverty, far below the GYD 47,500 absolute poverty line (SPSS, 1997).

Clearly, Guyana is among the poorest countries that are suffering from globalization as I have illustrated. Today, 35% of the population lives below the poverty line (as defined by the Government's recent Living Conditions Survey) (Egoumé-Bossogo, 2003:135) with virtually 19% living under conditions of extreme poverty. The significance of poverty, then, is not just the suffering it involves, though that is undeniably important, but that it represents an undeserved exile from a society where economic well-being and prosperity are unreachable. In addition, these conditions have better provided a fertile breeding ground for growing involvement in drug abuse and drug trafficking, especially in urban communities. In addition, violence has grown to an alarming proportion. As social upheavals increase which, at times, have led to rebellion against the government, crime and the fear of crime are two markedly dissimilar problems not just one and both are regrettably out of control.

Economic and social rights are fundamental, and with out them, civil and political rights are meaningless.¹⁸ On this score, a sound economy is a prerequisite for political stability. It is not a secret that economic insecurity can lead to political instability. Guyana’s former President, the late Cheddi Jagan, in his speech during a World Summit on Social Development held in Copenhagen, Denmark, March 6-12, 1995 summarized the situation with unmatched lucidity. He recognized that “the spread of poverty unchecked … in [ Guyana], the continuous swelling of the ranks of the unemployed and those that are underemployed…has led to increasing social tension” (Gardhari, 2000) and political tensions in this poor nation. In this sense, there is a need for “structural adjustment with a human face… [we] must return to [the] original mandate to mediate between capital markets and the developing countries…. We need economic growth with equity, with social justice and ecological justice" (ibid.) he concluded. Therefore, the rallying cry should be for the government to [de]neo-colonize its economy by renegotiating a more favorable term with the IMF and the World Bank that would benefit civil society instead of the multinationals. The government needs to develop strategies that would create decent paying jobs for its citizens. Social and economic securities are necessary for the improvement of the human condition and thus in the end would result in a change in the political climate for the better.

Conclusion

Globalization is proceeding selectively including and excluding segments of the economies and societies in and out of the networks of wealth and power that characterizes the new dominant system. In countries including Guyana, what is apparent is the government’s unwillingness to control its policy decisions. Under the guidance of the IMF and the World Bank, with the implementation of the SAP, the government is pressured to adopt policies that are responsive to capital needs, which are translated into continued social discontent, suffering, and impoverishment of civil society. Despite the dilemma that Guyana faces, the government was negotiating to enter the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) that was supposed to create a single free trade area by 2005 with 33 other countries. Fortunately, it came to an immediate halt after Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia, and Venezuela refused to sign the FTAA. In all of these countries, particularly those in the Caribbean and Central America, there is an on-going debate, especially with the signing of the Dominican Republic and Central America Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA), as to whether or not free trade would bring any benefits for the smaller economies. The smaller economies, like Guyana, obviously have some clear disadvantages that can work against them in any free trade arrangement. As such, the main task for these governments is not “getting the state out” but “to bring the state back in.” As such, “bringing the state back in does require a break with some of the most encompassing social-determinist assumptions of pluralism, structure-functionalist developmentalism, the various neo-Marxist” (Skocpol, 1985:20), and a recognition that the state is racist, sexist, classist, and homophobic.

Furthermore, it makes no sense for any government to follow economic dogma blindly, especially when such a paradigm serves the interests of multinationals and produces hardship for many of its citizens. Like capital, the syndrome of poverty has been internationalized. In this sense, a pressing question is how can the government deal with the interrelatedness of global capital, uneven growth, and poverty? As the Guyanese case shows that often there is a lack of consistency between macro-economic objectives and the goals of poverty reduction.

A more fundamental challenge the government will face, if it continues to move towards the neo-liberal model of economic restructuring, is the tension between the two dominant communities, East Indians and Blacks. As such, in reality, structural adjustment programs in Guyana,

require more flexible domestic and international political structures to deal with increasingly autonomous groups in civil society ¾families detached from the farm, workers who have lost their jobs, export producers whose products have declined in value as a result of artificial substitutions…For [Guyana and other poor nations], the challenge for the next decade is how to expedite the democratization process while revitalizing the economy (Cheru, 1997:149).

The present government under the Bharat Jadego’s administration¹⁹ will have to make visible and meaningful political concessions to the Afro-Guyanese community. This may be difficult for the People Progressive Party (PPP) to contemplate but it might, nonetheless, be necessary if a considerable recovery of Guyana’s economy is to be achieved. Thus, the final question is whether politics can transcend the racial divide that is sharply increasing between Indo-Guyanese and Afro-Guyanese? The answer is nothing but simple given the state of Guyana’s economy and the widespread of poverty among both groups.

9 Guyana had adopted a policy from the mid-1970-1989, which included the nationalization of private companies in mining, agriculture, banking and the distributive services. By 1988, the government controlled over 80 percent of the total value of recorded imports and exports and 85 percent of total investment.

10 The Amerindians have lived in these mining areas for centuries. They have voiced their objections to any mining or logging company operating on their ancestral lands, and are demanding that their rights to their lands be legally recognized and respected . Nonetheless, there is no legal support for the Amerindians, and their demands are overly ignored by the Geology and Mines Commission. Nevertheless, in October 1997, all of the community leaders of the Wai Wai, Wapisiana, and Macusi First Nations peoples formed the Touchau's Amerindian Council of Region 9 to defend their ancestral territorie s from miners and loggers. Despite the formation of the Council, two years later in July 1999, two mining concessions were granted to companies. Even though, these concessions are affecting over 400 indigenous communities, none of them were informed or consulted prior to the granting of concessions. Concessions continue to be granted.

11 The IMF and the World Bank is partly responsible for the environmental problems in Guyana, but its policies and conditions have only exacerbated the situation.

12 In terms of economic policy, Singapore has a socialist course on domestic policy and state owned enterprise but a free market orientation with regard to FDIP. Taiwan emphasizes government intervention. Despite the move towards privatization, the government still has a substantial role in the banking sector for example. Sugar, salt, and iron continue to be state monopolies.

13 In October 1991, the Barama Company Limited was given an investment contract giving the company logging rights. The 25 years logging license which ends in the year 2016 is renewable automatically for another 25 years.

14 Over 70 percent of Guyanese live in the rural areas and are involved in agriculture, mining, fishing, and forestry. Others are involved in road and river transportation. Yet, Guyana did not have the resources to maintain its infrastructure.

15 In Guyana, the relation between Blacks and East Indians was pronounced in 1964 during the country’s Civil War.

16 Organized labor in Guyana was closely tied to the major national political parties. In 1990, the largest labor organization, the Trades Union Congress (TUC), comprised eighteen unions, most of which were affiliated with the ruling People's National Congress (PNC) party. President Hoyte was honorary president of the oldest TUC member, the Guyana Labor Union (GLU).

17 Sometimes workers work six days for the week and will receive $1992.00 for the week.

18 For a more comprehensive discussion on the concept of rights from a Marxist perspective see “On the Jewish Question,” David McLellan (ed.). (1977). Karl Marx, Selected Writings. Oxford University Press.

19 In March 2001, Bharrat Jagdeo won a second term in elections that underscored Guyana's bitter racial tensions. The re-election of Jagdeo, an ethnic East Indian, caused rioting among Blacks. Blacks claimed that there was widespread election fraud in order for the Jagdeo’s administration to gain power.

Bibliography

Agamben, Giorgio. The Coming Community. (1993). Translated by Michael Hardt. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Callaghy, Thomas, (1993) “Vision and Transformation in the Global Political Economy: Lessons from the Second and Third Worlds,” in Robert Salter, Barry Schutz and Steven Dorr (eds.) Global Transformation and the Third World. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Ltd.

Caribbean Labor Statistics (2002). www.ilo.org/public/english/region/ampro/portofspain/digest/guyana/guy19.htm

Cheru, Fantu, (1997), “New Social Movements: Democratic Struggles and Human Rights in Africa,” in James Mittelman (ed.). Globalization Critical Reflections. Colorado: Lynne Rienner Ltd.

Cox, Robert, (1991) “The Political Economy and Social Choices,” in Daniel Drache and Meric Gertler (eds.) The New Era of Global Competition State Policy and Market Power. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press.

Cutter, Bowman, W., Joan Spero, and Laura D’Andrea, (March-April 2000), “New World, New Deal,” Foreign Affairs. p. 80-98. www.tcf.org/opinions/In_the_News/Wasow-NewWorld-BumDeal.html.

Dahl, Robert, (1969), “The Concept of Power,” in Roderick Bell et. al (eds.) Political Power: A Reader in Theory and Research. New York: New York Press.

Egoumé-Bossogo, Philippe, (2003), “Strategy for Sustainable Growth and Poverty Reduction, and Risks and Challenges,” in Philippe Egoumé-Bossogo, Ebrima Faal, Raj Nallari and Ethan Weisman (eds.). Guyana Exaperience with Macroeconomic Stabilization, Structural Adjustment and Poverty Reduction. Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund.

Egoumé-Bossogo, Philippe, (2003), “Introduction and Background” in Philippe Egoumé-Bossogo, Ebrima Faal, Raj Nallari and Ethan Weisman (eds.). Guyana Exaperience with Macroeconomic Stabilization, Structural Adjustment and Poverty Reduction. Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund.

Flaming, Lorene, (Sept. 1995), "An Economic Analysis of the Timber Industry in Guyana: Prospects for Strengthening State Capacity and Private Incentives for Sustainable Forest Management." Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.

Gifford, Mike, (Dec. 1994- Jan. 1995), “Foreign Debt Forces Rainforest Destruction in Guyana” Peace and Environmental News. Vol. 9 No. 10. www.perc.ca/PEN/1994-12-01/

Girdhari, Gary, (Feb. 2000), “Unbridled Globalization,” Guyana Journal. www.guyanajournal.com/globliz.html.

Hall, Stuart, (Spring 1989), “Ethnicity: Identity and Difference.” Radical America. 9-19.

Harvey, David, (Winter 1995), “Globalization in Question” in Rethinking Marxism. vol. 8, no. 4.

Hobsbawn, Eric. (1994). The Age of Extremes: A History of the World 1914-1991. New York: Pantheon.

Nkrumah, Kwame. (1965). Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism . London: Heinemann.

Mann, Michael. (1986). The Sources of Social Power. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Marx, Karl and Engels, Friedrich. (1967). The Communist Manifesto With an Introduction by AJP Taylor. Great Britain: Cox and Wynan Ltd.

Miliband, Ralph. (1969). The State in Capitalist Society. New York : Basic Books.

Nallari, Raj, (2003), “Poverty During the Transition and the Next Steps Toward Poverty Reduction,” in Philippe Egoumé-Bossogo, Ebrima Faal, Raj Nallari and Ethan Weisman (eds.). Guyana Experience with Macroeconomic Stabilization, Structural Adjustment and Poverty Reduction. Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund.

Offe, Claus. (1984). Contradictions of the Welfare State. London: Hutchinson.

Panitch, Leo, (1997), “Rethinking the Role of the State,” in James Mittelman (ed.). Globalization Critical Reflections. Colorado: Lynne Rienner Ltd.

Panitch, Leo and Swartz, David. (1988). The Assault on Trade Unions Freedom. Toronto: Garamond Press.

Polsby, Nelson (1963). Community Power and Political Theory. New Haven: Yale University.

Poulantzas, Nicos. (1974). Classes in Contemporary Capitalism. London: Verso.

Poulantzas, Nicos. (1973). Political Power and Social Classes . London : Sheed and Ward.

Poggi, Gianfranco. (1978). The Development of the Modern State A Sociological Introduction. California: Stanford University Press.

Ramsaran, Ramesh, (2002), “The Caribbean and the Global Challenge in the 21 st Century,” Ramesh Ramsaran (ed.). Caribbean Survival and the Global Challenge. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Ramsaran, Ramesh. (1992). The Challenge of Structural Adjustment in the Commonwealth Caribbean. New York: Praeger.

Singh, Chaitram. (1988). Guyana : Politics in a Plantation Society. New York: Praeger.

Sizer, Nigel and Rice, Richard. (1995). Backs to the Wall in Suriname: Forest Policy in a Country in Crisis. World Resources Institute. Washington D.C. http://pdf.wri.org/backstothewallinsuriname_bw.pdf

Skocpol, Theda, (1985), “Bringing the State Back in Strategies of Analysis in Current Research,” in Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschinejee, and Theda Skocpol (eds.). Bringing the State Back in. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Thompson, Mike, (1994), “An Economic Analysis of Forest Resources Charges in Guyana," Guyana Forest Commission. Georgetown. www.forestry.gov.gy/.

Toni, Ana, (1997), “An Overview of Asian Companies, Particularly Malaysian Companies,” http://archive.greenpeace.org/comms/97/forest/asian_companies_contents.html.

U.S. Library of Congress. (1992). Guyana Table of Content. http://countrystudies.us/guyana/3.htm.

Socio-economic and Production Systems Study (SPSS). (1997). Guyana Poor Rural Communities Services Project-Drainage and Irrigation Component. www.fao.org/docrep/007/ae392e/ae392e00.htm.

United States, Agency for International Development, (1992). Latin America and the Caribbean: Selected Economic Data . Washington D.C.

Wood, Ellen, Meiksins. (2003). Empire of Capital. New York: Verso.

World Rainforest Movement, (Feb. 2001), “ Guyana: Transnational Mining Companies’ Impacts on People and the Environment,” WRM Bulletin No. 43. www.wrm.org.uy/bulletin/43.html.

World Resources Institute. (1994). “Profit Without Plunder: Reaping Revenues from Guyana’s Tropical Forests Without Destroying them. Other Foreign Holders of Logging Concessions.” www.wri.org/wri/biodiv/guyana/205-pwp.html.

World Bank. (1993). Guyana: Private Sector Development. Washington, DC.